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RECENT CASES
ComRAcTs--REAL PROPERTY-JuDMENT LIENs. An executory contract
for the sale of land, duly recorded, was entered into by A and B. Several
payments were made by B. C, creditor of A, obtained a judgment against
him and, personally and by letter, notified B of such'judgment, and warned
him not to make any more payments on the contract. B made subsequent
payments on the contract to A. Over three years after entry of the judgment, C levied on the property, and it was sold at a sheriff's sale. This
was an action to quiet title. Held: The sale was valid, subject only to the
right of redemption and the contract of sale between A and B; B should
pay to C (buyer at sheriff's sale) the amount stipulated in the contract
less the amount paid to A prior to notice of judgment obtained by C against
A. Heath v. Dodson, 7 Wn. (2d) 667; 110 P. (2d) 845 (1941).
In this case the Washington court follows the general rule that a
vendee in possession of land under an executory contract of sale, while
not bound to investigate as to the existence of any judgment against the
vendor, will not be entitled to the benefit of payments made upon the
contract if, at the time of the making of such payments, he knew of the
existence of such a judgment. The mere docketing of the judgment, however, is not notice to the vendee, but the judgment creditor must give such
notice that the vendee actually knows of the judgment. 2 FiEmAN,
JuDmViNTs (5th ed.), § 966; 34 C. J. 598; Filley v. Duncan, 1 Neb. 134
(1871); Wehn v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N. W. 13 (1898); Hampson v. Edelen,
2 Harris & J. (Md.) 64 (1807); Parks v. Jackson, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 442
(1833); Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N. Y. 180 (1855).
However wise the Washington court may' be in adhering to the accepted rule in the instant case, this problem is a new one to this jurisdiction and the case may well, have been decided the other way. A
judgment is only a lien against the property of the debtor, and before it
can be asserted against specific property of the debtor there must normally
be some affirmative action on the part of the judgment creditor. It would
indeed be strange to say that a judgment creditor can make another his
own debtor merely by informing such person that his creditor owes money
to such judgment creditor. The vendee is bound by contract to make
his payments to the vendor, and until such time as another assumes the
benefits and liabilities of the vendor under the 'contract, the vendee's
obligation to continue making payments to the vendor remains. In the
casd of May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 96 Pac. 454, 1065 (1908), the Oregon
Supreme Court held that the defendant vendee was not required to make
the payments to the plaintiff, judgment creditor, until he acquired the
vendor's rights. "The vendor cannot assume to determine for himself,
and at his own risk, the controversy between the plaintiff and his debtor;
and defendant need not go into equity to settle their differences. He may
stand upon his contract, and when the plaintiff has acquired the vendor's
right to the money by perfecting title in himself the defendant will be
justified in making payment to him." Accord, Moyer v. Hinman, supra.
Under the holding in the instant case, whichever way he elects to make
his payments he is penalized. If he heeds the notice of the judgment
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and stops making payments on the contract, he makes himself liable to
the vendor, for a mere judgment against the vendor does not extinguish
his interest in the contract; if he disregards the notice of the judgment
he may be forced to pay twice those payments which came due between
the date of the notice of judgment and that on which the judgment creditor
obtained the vendor's interest in the contract.
REM. REV. STAT.,

§ 445-1, provides:

"The lien of judgments upon real

estate of the judgment debtor shall commence . .. (a) ... from the time
of the entry thereof; . . ." And § 445 says, "Personal property of the
debtor shall be held only from the time it is actually levied upon."
A contract of the type found in the instant case leaves the vendor with
two interests which usually run together, but which may be separated.
They are the interest in the real property, and the interest in the contract.
Evidently the Washington court considered these as inseparable and both
as interests in real property. Granted that under REm. REV. STAT. §
445-1 the lien upon real property commences from the time of entry of
the judgment, it does not follow that the lien should likewise commence
upon the vendor's interest in the contract. Such an interest should not be
considered an interest in real property, but has more of the nature of
personalty, and should be governed by § 445.
The solution of this dilemma is to adopt a rule similar to that of May
v. Emerson, supra, which would require the judgment creditor to exert
his lien against the judgment debtor's interest in the contract by some
affirmative action, either by enjoining the vendor from collecting further
payments, by garnishment of the payments as they fall due, or by attaching
the vendor's interest in the contract. Such a rule would undoubtedly
remove the hardship placed upon the vendee under the present holding,
and enable him more easily and with less risk to himself to make his
payments.
J. B. K.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-TRIAL--CONDUCT
OF JUDGE. In a prosecution
against a former county commissioner for misappropriations of public
funds and related misdeeds, defendant's counsel, while cross-examining a
principal witness, was held in contempt and fined by the trial judge,
in the presence of the jury, for repeatedly referring to alleged enmities
existing between the witness and the defendant. Counsel tendered his
personal check in payment of the fine but the court emphatically refused
it and demanded cash. Upon cash payment the jury was instructed to
disregard any of the events occurring between the court and counsel.
Held: That the conduct of the court in refusing to accept counsel's check
constituted reversible error. State v. Levy, 109 Wash. Dec. 1, 113 P. (2d)
306 (1941).
The power to warn, rebuke, or hold a party in contempt is an inherent
right of a court, but it must be exercised, especially in criminal proceedings, with due regard to the constitutional rights of the defendant. WASH.
CONST. Art. IV, § 16 forbids a judge from commenting on the evidence
or facts, while the right to a fair and impartial hearing is guaranteed by
the due process clause. Thus to discredit counsel for the defense, or to
impair his influence or destroy his usefulness, violates these rights and
constitutes reversible error. State v. Moneymaker, 100 Wash. 463, 171 Pac.
253 (1918); State v. Phillips, 59 Wash. 252, 109 Pac. 1047 (1910).
Obviously this does not mean that the court can never warn or rebuke

1942]

RECENT CASES

counsel, even in the presence of the jury, when he invites it. State v.
Elder, 130 Wash. 612, 228 Pac. 1016 (1924). If, however, -the rebuke is
uninvited and without just cause or reason it is error. State v. White, 10
Wash. 611, 39 Pac. 160 (1895).
So, when it is determined that the warning or rebuke was invited,
it becomes a question of ascertaining whether or not the court acted in
such a manner as to deprive the defendant of his above-mentioned constitutional rights. It may be assumed that in the principal case the conduct and attitude of counsel was c6ntemptuous and that the trial court
committed no error in holding him in contempt and levying a fine.

That much was invited, but the refusal to accept the personal check of
counsel was uninvited and thus falls within those cases where the action
of the court is without just cause or reason and therefore constitutes
error. And because the inferences which followed from the statement of

the court were prejudicial in that they tended to create the impression
that defendant's counsel was not to be trusted, and from this that the
defendant himself was not to be trusted, the court found them to be sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice. Cf. Mansfield v. United States,
76 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); 24 C. J. S. 849. This is to be distinguished
from remarks or conduct of the trial judge which are not reasonably
calculated to influence the judgment of the jury and are not presumed
to be prejudicial. Cf. State v. Birch, 183 Wash. 670, 49 P. (2d) 921 (1935).
W. A. A.
RELEASE-COVENANT NOT To SUE-JoiNT TORT-FEASORS. While an action
for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an automobile
collision was pending, plaintiff executed a "covenant not to sue" in favor
of one joint tort-feasor, with the reservation that "this instrument is not
intended as a release or discharge of . . . any person whatsoever, but
only as a covenant not to sue." Held: The instrument is a release, rather
than a covenant not to sue, and operates to release the other joint tortfeasors also. Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wn. (2d) 250, 111 P. (2d) 1003 (1941).
At common law a covenant not to sue is universally held not to discharge a joint tort-feasor. Berry v. Pullman Co., 249 Fed. 816, L. R. A.
1918F 358 (1918); Snow v. Chandler, 10 N. H. 92, 34 Am. Dec. 140
(1839). It does not extinguish a cause of action against a wrongdoer,
but only entities him to damages in case the covenant is violated; hence,
it technically discharges no one.
A release, on the other hand, is the surrender of a cause of action.
Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa 575, 79 N. W. 344 (1899); Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis.
138, 6 N. W. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 830 (1880). In the early common law, as to
those persons acting in concert, each was subject to the entire debt.
Therefore, a release by the creditor of any one of them from his entire
liability was held to be a satisfaction of the claim, and to bar further
action against the joint debtors. This rule was later extended to include
those wrongdoers who acted concurrently in causing injury to the plaintiff.
Tanana Trading Co. v. North Am. Trading Co., 220 Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 9th,
1915); Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 268 Pac. 943 (1928). The rationale
that a person is entitled to but one satisfaction arises from the confused
identification of release and satisfaction.
Under this common law doctrine, a reservation of rights against the
remaining tort-feasors would be repugnant to the legal effect of release
and therefore would be void. Bea v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P. (2d) 740
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(1932); Walsh v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. Co., 204 N. Y. 58, 87 N. E. 408, 37
L. R. A. (n.s.) 1137 (1912).
The Washington court, in a long line of decisions, has adopted the
orthodox common law rule as to the effect to be given to a release of
one joint tort-feasor. Rust v. Schlaitzer, 175 Wash. 331, 27 P. (2d) 571
(1933); J. E. Pinkham Lbr. Co. v. Woodland State Bank, 156 Wash. 117,
286 Pac. 95 (1930), and cases cited therein. And in the Pinkham case the
court found no occasion for a different result though the amount of
recovery was unliquidated and the release only partial; the decision was
said to be dictated by stare decisis.
Moreover, the position taken by our court seems to preclude the possibility of an injured party by any means receiving payment from one
joint tort-feasor and still retaining his right of action against the others.
The court, expressing its desire to prevent a double recovery, has been
extremely reluctant to interpret a writing as a covenant not to sue, rather
than a release. Rust v. Schlaitzer, supra; J. E. Pinkham Lbr. Co. v. Woodland State Bank, supra; Sunset Copper Co. v. Black, 125 Wash. 365, 217
Pac. 5 (1924). It has not made use of the legal fiction of finding a release with a reservation of rights to be in effect a covenant not to sue.
See Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455, 66 N. E. 133 (1903). And Stusser v.
Mutual Union Ins. Co., 127 Wash. 449, 221 Pac. 331 (1923), in which the
partial release of a judgment debt was said to be satisfaction pro tanto
only, has not been persuasive in subsequent decisions.
While the application of the strict common law rules has some justification, it imposes an unreasonable hardship on the plaintiff, in that he must
either forego any opportunity to obtain what he can get without suit, or
he must give up his entire claim without full compensation. PROSSER,
TORTS (1941) § 109. The reversal of a settled course of decisions in this
matter cannot work an injustice to anyone, since the older rule always
works to defeat the intention of the parties. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed Final Draft No. 9) § 11.
Modern authority favors disregarding the technical distinctions of the
old common law. Williston proposes that if the rights are expressly reserved, no distinction should be taken between a covenant not to sue and
a release, except that if it appears that the sum received was paid in
full redress or is so large that any further award would be excessive.
then no further action should be allowed. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936
ed.) § 338C. The danger of double recovery may also be avoided by crediting the amount paid for the release or covenant to the other tort-feasors
as satisfaction pro tanto. Miller v. Beck, supra; Ellis v. Esson, supra.
There is a considerable body of authority which holds that the discharge
will not bar a claim against other tort-feasors if the parties so agreed
orally. Steenhuis v. Holland, 217 Ala. 105, 115 So. 2 (1927); Schmidt v.
Austin, 159 N. E. 850 (Ohio App., 1927).
The Washington court, in Johnson v. Stewart, 1 Wn. (2d) 439, 96 P. (2d)
473 (1939), found the strict common law rule applicable to joint contract
obligors too harsh, and modified it to allow the court more easily to
effectuate the intentions of the parties. Note, 15 WASH. L. REV. 187 (1940).
An even greater reformation in regard to the effect of a release in the
case of joint tort-feasors seems equally desirable. If judicial reformation
is no longer feasible, then perhaps statutory change will bring a more
D. 1. W.
satisfactory solution to the problem.

